ABSTRACT For realizing the fine-grained access control with non-interactive approach, and effectively guaranteeing the comprehensive security for information under the post-quantum environment, this paper proposes an attribute-based signcryption (ABSC) scheme based on the intractability of lattices. The proposed ABSC scheme is proved indistinguishable against the inner adaptive-chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) and existentially unforgeable against inner chosen-message attacks (EUF-CMA), in the standard model. The theoretical analysis presents that the public key size and the computational cost of the signcryption operation are both reduced obviously, compared with the signature and then encryption mechanism. An efficient variant is also presented that significantly decreases the computational complexity of unsigncryption operation at the expense of an increase in the ciphertext size.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a distributed open computing environment, the Internet integrates computing resources and improves system utilization. Cloud computing reduces the hardware and software costs, energy consumption and system maintenance expense due to undertaking the computing and storage tasks of users. As a result, cloud computing has become a prospective form of computing. The user data is migrated from local devices to the cloud, which brings security issues to the data. In the multi-user access environment, it is the key issue of the correct utilization for data to reduce the storage cost and ensuring real-time consistency. Attribute-based cryptography has been proposed in time for non-interactive fine-grained access control [1] - [5] .
The comprehensive security of the information is the valid approach to ensure data reliability in a high-level. A feasible method to ensure comprehensive security is to implement signature and encryption for message successively.
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However, the signcryption, proposed by Zheng [6] , is a better alternative due to the much lower cost. The signcryption has important applications in many scenarios such as key management, electronic commerce, mobile communications, and smart cards. In 2011, signcryption was formally accepted as an international standard, ISO/IEC 29150:2011, by the International Organization of Standardization (ISO).
The high efficiency of signcryption and the flexibility of attribute-based cryptography make attribute-based signcryption (ABSC) very useful for handing out the secret information under the control of access policy. In fact, ABSC has many other advantages except realizing integrity, authentication, non-repudiation, confidentiality and fine-grained access with lower cost. ABS enjoys perfect privacy, unlinkability and collusion resistant unforgeability. So, it is widely applied in anonymous authentication, trust negotiations [7] and attribute-based messaging. When ABS is integrated into ABSC, the anonymity of the signature in ABSC is further strengthened. The anonymity of ABE is achieved by the policy. The ABE is divided into ciphertext policy attributebased encryption (CP-ABE) and key policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE), according to the difference that the policy is imposed upon ciphertext and private key. Indeed, ABSC recently has been extensively studied and many fruits [1] - [4] , [8] - [10] have been obtained.
The existing ABSC schemes [1] - [3] , [4] are all based on the intractability assumptions from the number theory. The blossom of quantum computation badly menaces their hardness assumptions [11] , [12] . As a result, it urgently needs to design an ABSC scheme with ability to resist the quantum attacks. Lattice is extensively believed to be one of the most powerful cryptography tools to stand up the quantum attacks. In addition, lattice-based cryptography has many other attractive properties. It has high asymptotic computational efficiency due to only involving moderate modular additions and moderate modular multiplications. It is very flexible to be used to realize some complex cryptographic primitives and tools such as fully homomorphic encryption [13] - [17] , fully homomorphic signature [18] , [19] and multilinear map [20] , [21] . Xiang et al. [8] made a progress to construct an ABSC scheme based on lattice by conferring private keys according to attributes. However, the ciphertexts are generated also according to attributes. As a result, this scheme [8] cannot express the access policy well and does not enjoy the flexibility of the policy. Therefore, it has an important theoretical and practical significance to construct a true ABSC scheme based on lattice.
A. OUR CONTRIBUTION
In this paper, we propose an ABSC from lattices. Our contributions are summarize as follows:
• To realize the fine-grained access control in a noninteractive way and resist the known quantum attacks, we construct a key policy attribute-based signcryption scheme based on the lattice hardness assumptions by borrowing the private key extraction technique for policy from [22] . Meanwhile, in the proposed ABSC, an attribute based signature scheme from lattices is constructed. The anonymity of the signer is improved. Only the group satisfying a particular policy can learn the attribute information of the signer. However, in the signature and then encryption (StE) with identical security, the attributes of signer are leaked to the public.
• For hiding the signature value and shortening the ciphertext size, the public encryption section used in our scheme is a variant of Regev encryption [23] , denoted by E G . This variant E G is not semantically secure. It was made IND-CCA secure with FO technique, such as [24] , but the hash function is replaced with a signature. However, it is only proved secure in the random oracle. In fact, the encryption E G is always assembled with another part of ciphertext to form an IND-CPA secure scheme, such as [23] , [25] , and [26] . Different from the above schemes, we combine it with a new section of ciphertext with small size to get an IND-CCA1 secure scheme in the standard model. That is, the security reduction is achieved by using the trapdoor switching technique based on the leftover hash lemma. The simple and efficient Exclusive-Or operation is employed to hide the original information. Thus, the proposed scheme is efficient to guarantee the security of data especially with big size. The proposed ABS is deliberately increased a segment with a small size, such that it can be proved unforgeable against the inner selective attribute set adaptive-chosen message attacks.
• The encryption section and the signature section are closely tangled together to strengthen the security. Not only the non-malleability of encryption is guaranteed by the preceding signature, but also the tag used for encryption is selected according to the preceding signature rather than by encryptor. In a word, the IND-CCA1 secure scheme is enhanced to IND-CCA2 security by reusing the function of the signature for the message. However, it leads to difficulty in security reduction. To vanish the trapdoor in reduction, we utilize a chameleon hash function. In the proposed scheme, the computational overhead of signcryption decreases more than 50%, compared to StE. And the unsigncryption cost of the variety scheme reduces about 50%.
B. PAPER OUTLINE
This paper is organized as follows. The necessary preliminaries are introduced in Section 2. The primitive and the security models of ABSC are reviewed in Section 3. In Section 4, the proposed scheme is presented in detail, followed by the consistency proof and the security reduction. The performance analysis and a variant are given in Section 5. Finally, the concluding remarks are drawn in Section 6.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this paper, the notions and the corresponding meaning are as follows. Z/R : the set of integers / real numbers; T: real interval [0, 1); Z q : residue class mod q. Z n /Z n q , R n : vectors space on Z/Z q , R; Z n×m /Z n×m q : matrices space on Z/Z q . lower-case and bold letters: vectors; upper-case and bold letters: matrices.Ã: Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of A; s 1 (·): the largest singular value of a matrix; · the maximum norm of the column vectors in a matrix or the norm of a vector. s $ ← U (P): uniformly choose from P; s ← χ(P) : choose from P according to the distribution χ ; s ∈ χ /s $ ← χ for short. [k]: {1, 2, · · · , k}. | · |: the length of bit string; : horizontally concatenate matrices or vectors.
A. LATTICE AND GAUSSIAN DISTRIBUTION

Definition 1 (Lattice): Lattice is a discrete additive subgroup of R m :
= L(B) = {Bx = n i=1 x i b i |x ∈ Z n }, where the linearly independent vectors B = {b 1 , b 2 , · · · , b n } constitute a basis. In fact, the q-ary lattice ⊥ (A) = {z ∈ Z m : Az = 0 mod q} is more frequently used. The security of the proposed scheme depends on LWE and SIS problems, whose definitions and intractability are as follows.
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For integers n > 0 and q > 2, A s,χ indicates the distribution of (a, a t s + x) over Z n q × Z q , where a
and x is chosen from some distribution χ. [23] ): Given an integer q = q(n) and a distribution χ over Z q , the learning with errors problem LWE q,χ is to distinguish A s,χ from U (Z n q ) × U (Z q ) with non-negligible probability, where s $ ← U (Z n q ). For α ∈ R + , α denotes the distribution of a normal variable with mean 0 and standard deviation α/ √ 2π , reduced modulo 1. For x ← α ,¯ α is the discretized normal distribution on Z q , namely q · x mod q, where represents rounding.
Definition 2 (Learning With Errors (LWE)
Proposition 1 (Hardness of LWE [23] , [27] ): For α = α(n) ∈ (0, 1) and a prime q = q(n) satisfying αq > 2 √ n, the LWE q,¯ α is as hard as approximating SIVP γ withiñ O(n/α) factors (referring to [28] 
The discrete Gauss distribution has the following properties.
1) (Theorem 3.1 [25] 
3) ( [25] ) For arbitrary y ∈ Z n q the min-entropy of y's pre-image x, namely Ax = y and x ≤ s √ m, is at least ω(log n). In the scheme design and security reduction, a special matrix R $ ← {−1, 1} k×m is used, because it has small norm and satisfies leftover hash lemma.
Proposition 4 (Lemma 15 [26] [30] ): For some fixed real δ > 0, integer q > 2 and integer m ≥ (5 + 3δ)n log q, the algorithm TrapGen(n, q) outputs A ∈ Z n×m q , S ∈ Z m×m q in polynomial time, such that A is within negligible statistical distance from
, with overwhelming probability. In the Pre-image algorithm, a solution vector x ∈ Z n q is computed by solving equation Ax = y mod q. Next, a vector z is selected randomly under the condition that z VOLUME 7, 2019 belongs to ⊥ (A) and z is close to −x . Then, the vector
C. UNIVERSAL HASH FUNCTION AND CHAMELEON HASH FUNCTION
Definition 5 (Universal Hash Functions [31]): A family of hash functions
We introduce the conception about chameleon hash function by the example of the construction based on lattice.
Proposition 11 (Lemma 4.1 of [32] ): 
The chameleon hash functions have the following 4 properties: efficient forward computation, collision-resistance, uniformity and chameleon property. The chameleon property is that the hash functions have ability to find a collision for any given input by utilizing the known trapdoor.
III. ATTTRIBUTE-BASED SIGNCRYPTION: PRIMITIVE AND SECURITY MODELS
Definition 6 (Attribute-Based Signcryption): AnAttributeBased signcryption scheme consists of the following four algorithms:
• Setup (1 ) 
Definition 7 (Consistency of Signcryption):
Define the successful probability of the unsigncryption for a signcryption scheme as follows.
The signcryption scheme is called consistent, if and only if 1 − p is negligible.
For defining the confidentiality of an ABSC scheme, we give Game IND-sAtt-CCA2 between the challenger and a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary as follows, by referring to [1] , [8] .
Game IND-sAtt-CCA2
• Initial: A announces the challenge attribute set As * r . C executes Setup(1 ) to generate and publish P p and MPk to A, but keeps MSk to itself.
• Phase 1: A implements polynomially bounded queries:
-Extract(Policy): A submits a policy Policy to C for private key query. If As * r satisfies Policy, C replies ⊥. Otherwise, C answers with the corresponding private key for Policy. -Signcrypt(µ, As s , Policy s , Policy r ): A sends a message µ, the sender's attribute set As s , the policy Policy s and the receiver's policy Policy r for signcryption query. If As s meets Policy s , C returns the corresponding ciphertext. Otherwise C returns ⊥. -Unsigncrypt(c, As s , Policy r ): A submits a ciphertext c, the sender's attribute set As s and the policy Policy r satisfied by the receiver's attribute set to C for unsigncryption queries. If c is a valid ciphertext, C returns the corresponding plaintext; otherwise, C returns ⊥.
• Challenge: A sends two isometric message plaintexts µ 0 , µ 1 , the sender's attribute set As s , the policy Policy s satisfied by the senders and the policy satisfied by the receivers Policy r to C. C randomly selects a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. C executes Signcrypt for u b to get c * , and sends c * to A.
• Phase 2: A repeats the queries as in phase 1, except the unsigncryption query on c * . The probability that the ciphertext generated normally under the other attribute sets equals c * is less than q −[(|Att r |+1)m+1] , and it is negligible.
• Guess: A outputs its guess b ∈ {0, 1} for b.
Definition 8 (Confidentiality of Signcryption): If there is no PPT adversary who can win Game IND-sAtt-CCA2 with non-negligible advantage, then the corresponding attributebased signcryption scheme is called indistinguishable against inner selective attribute adaptive-chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-sAtt-CCA2).
To capture the unforgeability, we introduce Game EUFsAtt-CMA played between the challenger C and a PPT forgery F. Game EUF-sAtt-CMA
• Initial: This step is totally identical to that in Game EUF-sAtt-CMA.
• Query: A executes polynomially bounded Extract, Signcrypt and Unsigncrypt queries as in Game IND-sAtt-CMA.
• Forgery: F outputs a tuple (µ, c, Policy r , As * s ), where c is a valid ciphertext for µ under the sender's attribute set As * s , and the policy Policy r satisfied by the receivers. Define the advantage of F to win Game EUF-sAtt-CMA as
where NS is the Boolean value for the fact that σ is a new signature for µ.
Definition 9 (Existential Unforgeability of Signcryption): An attribute-Based signcryption scheme is called existentially unforgeable against inner selective attribute adaptive-chosen message attacks (EUF-sAtt-CMA), if there exists no PPT inner forger who can win Game SUF-sAtt-CMA with nonnegligible advantage.
IV. ATTRIBUTE-BASED SIGNCRYPTION SCHEME FROM LATTICES A. ENCODING FOR POLICY
Lewko and Waters [33] proposed a linear time algorithm (LW algorithm for short) to translate a Boolean circuit corresponding to access policy into a Linear Span Program (LSP) matrix. The core idea is as follows. The Boolean circuit can be expressed by a binary tree. Every node in the tree corresponds to a binary string, which will be discretized into a row of the LSP matrix. The binary string of a parent node is the computing result of the strings of its sons under the operator corresponding to this node. Appoint the string of the root node as some string. Then, the strings of nodes can be computed from root to leaves.
The concrete procedure of the encoding is as follows. 1) Select suitable integers ι, ς.
2) Choose hash functions:
The form of H N is similar with that of the chameleon hash functions in [32] . Specifically, 3) Choose the full-rank differences (FRD) encoding [26] H : Z n q → Z n×n q . 4) Choose suitable Gaussian parameters s 1 , s 2 . 5) Generate public key and private key:
-Choose ν $ ← Z n q . 6) Output the master public key and keep the master private key as secret:
• Extract(Pub, MSk, Plc): Take inputs the public key Pub, master secret key MSk and Policy Plc, generate a secret key SK Plc for the policy Plc:
1) Translate the policy Plc into a LSP matrix L with LW algorithm. Suppose L ∈ Z k×λ , without loss of generality.. 2) Choose a temporary matrices Z i
, where L (i) denotes the i-th column of L. 4) Obtain a short basis for ⊥ (M) by calling , c 1 , c 2 , c ,c) .
3) Obtain (σ, e 0 ) by computing (T r t ) −1 (T r t c 1 mod q). 4) Solve equation A Att r t s = c 1 − (σ, e 0 ) t to get s. r 2 ) holds, continue. Otherwise output ⊥ and abort.
Transform(K, L, As): Generate a private key K (2) for the attribute set As. Input: policy matrix L, private key K for L, attribute set As. Output: private key K (2) for attribute set As.
1) If As dose not satisfy L, return ⊥.
2) Find an appropriate g ∈ Z k satisfying the following constraints.
(1) If i / ∈ As then g i = 0. Otherwise, g i = 0 and g i is as small as possible. (2) Compute (d 0 λ ) = g t L to get some small integer d. Here k, λ denote the number of all attributes and the columns of L, respectively. 3) Extract a sub-matrix K (1) ∈ Z ρm×ρm from K by the following procedure.
(1) If i / ∈ As, remove the corresponding rows of K for the attribute i. Then, obtain a matrix
as the secret key for attribute set As.
C. CORRECTNESS AND PARAMETERS SETTING
First, we show that a valid private key of the attribute set is obtained in the algorithm Transform by the following two facts. Firstly,
On the one hand, g i = 0, when i / ∈ As. On the other hand, K (1) is the sub-matrix of K corresponding to the columns of As ∪ {k + 1}. Therefore, P is a sub-matrix of P (1) , where P (1) = (3) , where 0 is the zero matrix with dimension n × λm and K is the uper sub-matrix of K (3) ∈ Z (k+λ+1)m×(k+1)m , where K (3) is the leftmost submatrix of K and K is the trapdoor of ⊥ (M). As a result, P (1) is the sub-matrix of P (2) .
As a result, P = 0. Secondly, because
K (2) is small. Therefore, K (2) is the private key for As. Second, the correct (σ, e 0 ) t is obtained in step 3 of unsigncryption.
Then, the correct vector s can be obtained in step 4 of unsigncryption, similarly (µ, r 1 , r 2 ) in step 5.
Third, σ ≤ s 1 √ ( + 2)m holds due to Proposition 10 and Proposition 3, and [A Att s D υ ]σ = ν naturally holds (see the analysis under Proposition 10). In summary, this scheme can unsigncrypt correctly. Certainly, the following requirements are needed.
• The SIS problem must be hard. According to Proposition 2, q ≥ βω( √ n log n).
• The LWE problem must be hard. According to Proposition 1, αq > 2 √ n.
• TrapGen algorithm should work well. According to Proposition 6, m > 6n log q.
• SampleLeft and SampleRight algorithm should work well. It needs s 1 to be large enough, s 1 = O( √ n log q)ω(log 1.5 m)(k + 1)m, according to Proposition 7 and Proposition 8. According to the above constraints, the parameters should be set as follows, where n δ > log q , and Q is the number for signature queries.
Remark 1: Note that this scheme also supports threshold policy, when the encode for the threshold policy is a Vandermonde matrix. Certainly, the parameters should be adjusted accordingly. Please refer to [34] for more details.
D. SECURITY
Theorem 1 (Confidentiality): In the standard model, if there is an inner PPT adversary who can attack the proposed signcryption scheme in Game IND-sAtt-CCA2
with non-negligible advantage, then there is an algorithm that can solve the decision-LWE q,α problem for α = O((n log q) 0.5 )ω(log 1.5 m)(k + 1)m/q. Proof: Because H 2 and H 3 are universal hash functions, c (resp. c ) is statistically indistinguishable with the uniform distribution over {0, 1} (|µ|+|r 1 |+|r 2 |) (resp. Z m q ). Therefore, the distinguishable ability of the adversary comes from c 1 , c 2 . To complete the proof, a sequence of games is defined as follows:
• G 0 : This is the real game.
• G 1 : Change the method to generate public keys. Without loss of generality, suppose the measure of the challenge attribute set is and the challenge attribute set is As * r = {1, 2, · · · , }. C queries LWE oracle to obtain a group of LWE instance (y i ,
• G 2 : Change the method to generate B, C:
• 
The correctness of this theorem is implied in the facts that the successive games are indistinguishable and the adversary is just facing an LWE instance in the last scheme.
Lemma 1: The games G 0 , G 1 are statistically indistinguishable. And in G 1 , the challenger C can reply the private key queries and decryption queries.
Proof: First, one difference between G 0 and G 1 is the generation method for some matrices. In Second, in G 1 , C can reply the private key queries for policies as Boyen13 [22] does. For the convenience of depiction, suppose the attributes used for the private key query are
1) If the attribute set As * satisfies the policy L, then reply ⊥. 2) Construct policy matrix L with LW algorithm. 3) For the convenience of depiction, let the symbol ''⇔'' denote ''if and only if". The attribute set As does not satisfy the policy Plc. ⇔ The space extended by the rows
, where L is the matrix obtained by deleting the leftmost column of L.
include at least a full rank square sub-matrix. W.l.o.g, suppose the full rank square sub-matrix corresponds to the columns {c 1 , c 2 , · · · , c }.
where 
Let P l denote the diagonal sub-matrix constituted by the leftmost km columns of P, and P r the sub-matrix constituted by the remainder columns. 8) Construct a block diagonal matrix S T ∈ Z km×km . If i / ∈ {d 1 , d 2 , · · · , d ρ }, set the i-th block to be T i ; otherwise, set it to be S c k . Here, S c k is the first key matrix not be appointed. Obviously, S T is a trapdoor for ⊥ (P l ). 9) Extend the basis S Tr ← SampleBaisLeft(P l , P r , S T , s 2 ).
10)
as the secret key for policy Plc. In fact, the bases in G 0 and G 1 are both obtained by calling algorithm SampleBaisLeft. And the Gaussian parameters used are identical. According to Proposition 9, the two bases are statistically indistinguishable. Given a policy, C can get a corresponding private key with the above method. It is natural that C can reply the decryption query with this private key.
Lemma 2: The games G 1 , G 2 are statistically indistinguishable. In G 2 , C can reply the unsigncryption queries.
Proof: According to the uniform distribution property of the parity checking matrix generated by TrapGen, the B in G 1 is statistically indistinguishable from the B in G 2 . According to Lemma 13 of [26] , the C is also statistically indistinguishable from that in G 2 .
If the attribute set As does not satisfy the policy L, C replies with ⊥. Otherwise, C replies the decryption queries as follows. Without loss of generality, let Att = {i 1 
Note that the public key corresponding to the ciphertext is (c 1 , c 2 ) . Obviously, (c 1 ,
t s + (e 0 , R * t e 0 ). 5) Decrypt the ciphertext (c 1 , c 2 ) with the trapdoor T A0B to get s, e 0 , R * t e 0 . 6) Compute σ = c 1 − A Att t s. 7) Because C has s, σ, e 0 , it can normally execute the subsequent decryption procedure, namely steps 5.
∼ 10. in Unsigncrypt. The only difference in replying unsigncryption queries in G 2 and G 1 is that C cannot unsigncrypt when t g = t * g in G 2 . Before the challenge ciphertext is generated, t * g ∈ Z n q is hidden from the adversary A. Even not considering the collision of the hash function H N , the probability that t g generated normally satisfies t g = t g * is q −n , which is negligible. After the challenge ciphertext is published, A knows t * g . If A can normally generate t g to satisfy t g = t * g , then A can find a collision for the hash function H N or H 1 . Hence, this probability is negligible. Therefore, G 1 and G 2 are statistically indistinguishable.
Lemma 3: The games G 2 , G 3 are statistically indistinguishable.
Proof:
where
According to the property of TrapGen (see Proposition 6), the two hash functions are statistically indistinguishable. On the one hand, in G 3 , the random vector t 1 chosen from D h q (N 1 ) is used only once in the challenge ciphertext. On the other hand, this t 1 also satisfies t 1 ≤ s √ m with overwhelming probability, according to item 2 of Proposition 3. Hence, this t 1 cannot be distinguished from the one normally generated.
Lemma 4: The games G 3 , G 4 are computationally indistinguishable. In G 4 , the challenge ciphertext is exactly an LWE instance.
Proof: If the LWE instance given by LWE oracle comes from O $ , the games G 3 , G 4 are computationally indistinguishable due to LWE hardness (see Proposition 1). If the LWE instance is from O s , the game G 4 is a case of G 3 due to the following fact. In other words, G 4 and
Theorem 2 (EUF-sAtt-CMA): In the standard model, if there is a PPT inner adversary who can forge a signature in
Game EUF-sAtt-CMA with non-negligible probability, then there is an efficient algorithm to solve SIS q,β for β = Cι ms 1 .
• Initial: F submits an attribute set As * s that it wants to attack. C builds matrices as follows. • Queries:
-private key queries: C deals with the private key queries as in G 1 of Theorem 1. -signcrypt queries: There are two cases:
(1) The sender's attribute set does not satisfy the policy L ps . C replies ⊥. (2) The sender's attribute set satisfies the policy L ps . F does as follows. 1) Choose r 1 $ ← {0, 1} ι and compute
, Te, ν , s 1 ). 6) According to [35, Th. 3.4] , the sample (σ 1 , σ 2 ) obeys the distribution D ν q (A ),s 1 . Output (σ 1 , σ 2 ) as the signature.
-unsigncrypt queries: There are two cases:
(1) If the receiver's attribute set does not satisfy the policy L pr , C replies ⊥.
(2) The receiver's attribute set As r = As * s satisfies the policy L pr , then F can unsigncrypt with the method in G 2 of Theorem 1.
• Forge: Finally, F outputs a valid forgery signature (r 1 , σ ) for some message µ under the attribute set As * , where σ ∈ Z ( +2)m . For simplicity, express σ as
σ as a solution for the SIS problem. The reason is shown in the next lemma.
Lemma 5:
The vector σ obtained above is a valid solution for SIS q,β problem with overwhelming probability, for β = kO( √ n log q)ω(log 1.5 m)m 2 . And the probability that C gets the solution is non-negligible.
Proof: At first, due to
Second,
Here, the third inequality holds due to Proposition 4,3 and 10. Third, when q is bigger than the double of the number of queries Q, C will get this solution with probability more than 2/3, according to Lemma 26 and 27 of [36] .
V. PERFORMANCE AND VARIANT A. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, let us compare the performance of the proposed scheme with the mechanism of signature and then encryption. For clarity, we give the universal conclusion for the computational overhand for pre-image sampling algorithm, firstly.
Lemma 6: When the parity check matrix belongs to Z n×m q , the cost of the pre-image sampling algorithm is roughly m 2 + 2mn Z × q with some optimization. Proof: The pre-image algorithm involves three steps, namely solving equation, SampleD and vector addition. The cost of vector addition is much less than the other two steps, and it is ignored.
The solving equation group Ax = y involves Gaussian elimination and back substitution operations. In the Gaussian elimination, a triangle matrix B multiplies the coefficient matrix A to obtain trapezoid result matrix D, namely, BA = D. The repeating elimination operation can be avoided by storing B and D. Given a new syndrome y, it only needs to compute y 1 = By and execute back substitution for Dx = y 1 , due to By = y 1 = Dx = BAx and y = B −1 By = B −1 BAx = Ax. The cost of the multiplication By is about n(n+1)/2 Z × q . The back substitution is roughly mn − (n − 1)n/2 Z × q . As a result, the cost to solve equation group is about mn Z × q . SampleD can be divided into the multiplications between the Gram-Schmidt vector of the basis and the evolutive vector of a solution, the inner products of Gram-Schmidt vector of the basis, the scalar multiplications for a small integer and a vector with small elements, and m discrete Gaussian sampling (DGS). The magnitude of DGS is much less than the elementary operations in the other steps, so its cost is neglected. The overheads of the first three kinds of operations are m 2 Z × q , m 2 Z × and m 2 Z × , respectively. The cost of the inner product operation is ignored by storing the value of the inner product. According to experiments, the cost of Z × q is roughly 341.7 times of that of Z × . Therefore, the cost of SampleD is about m 2 Z × q . The above analysis can well support this lemma. Remark 2: In the StE approach, to guarantee the nonmalleability of ciphertext, the ciphertext should be signed VOLUME 7, 2019 with an unforgeable signature algorithm. If the public and private keys of the signature are published with PKI or identity mechanism, not only is the key size in the system too tremendous, but this will also leak the individual information of the signer. Hence, it is a better way to sign with the key of attributes. Based on this, the performance of the proposed signcryption scheme and that of StE scheme are compared as follows.
First, the key sizes are compared. In StE, no extra public keys and private keys are needed for the signature for ciphertext, according to Remark 2. Therefore, the public key size and private key size are identical in the two mechanisms, respectively.
Second, the computational costs are compared. In the signcryption, the computational cost mainly lies in steps 4, 5, 10 and 11. The step 4 extracts the private key corresponding to the attribute set. Not only can it be executed in advance, but also it needs to be run only once for the same attribute set under a policy. Hence, its computational cost in every signcryption is ignored. The cost of step 5 is ρ 2 m 2 + (ρ + 1)nm Z × q , according to Lemma 6. The costs of step 10 and 11 are ρ nm Z × q and nm Z × q , respectively. Therefore, the total cost of Signcrypt is ρ 2 m 2 + 2(ρ + 1)nm Z × q . In StE, an extra signature is used to guarantee the non-malleability of ciphertext, and its overhead is ρ 2 m 2 + (ρ + 1)nm Z × q . Therefore, the total cost of the signature and encryption in StE is 2ρ 2 m 2 + 3(ρ + 1)nm Z × q . That means the Signcrypt cost is less than 50% of that of StE. In the signcryption scheme, the computational cost of unsigncryption mainly lies in steps 3, 4, 5 and 11. Their costs are ( +1) 2 In fact, the computational cost of unsigncryption operation can be reduced greatly by replacing the public encryption section in the above scheme. In the variant, the steps secure encryption scheme to IND-CCA1 security by introducing an extra ciphertext with small size. Furthermore, the unforgeability of the signature for messages is reused so that the proposed ABSC is proved IND-CCA2 secure against inner adversary in the standard model. In the ABSC scheme, an ABS scheme based on lattice is constructed, which is proved EUF-CMA against inner adversary in the standard model. The theoretical analysis shows that the computational cost is reduced obviously, especially when the maximum measure of the minimum attribute set is not big. In addition, it is interesting to design an efficient ciphertext policy ABSC scheme from lattices. We defer it to the future work. 
